



29 MAR 82 11 06Z
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET

NOD344

PAGE 01 BEIJIN 03819 01 OF 02 291052Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W COPY 1/2 OF 20 COPIES
-----024623 291053Z /11

O 291029Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1235

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 03819

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 3/29/02 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W. JR) OR-M
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, CH, MASS, TW
SUBJECT: GETTING THE US-CHINA TALKS BACK ON TRACK

REF: A) STATE 080492, B) BEIJING 01056

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IT SHOULD BE EVIDENT THAT OUR TALKS WITH THE PRC ON THE TAIWAN ARMS ISSUE ARE IN GREAT DANGER OF FOUNDERING. WE SEE THIS NOT ONLY IN THE STIFENESS OF THE PRC'S PRIVATE DEMARCHES, BUT ALSO IN THE INCREASINGLY SHRILL TONE OF PRC CRITICISMS DESIGNED TO REACH THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS.

3. I BELIEVE THE PRC IS DRIVEN BY DEEP-SEATED SUSPICIONS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS TOWARD THE ISLAND AND RESENTMENT OVER ALLEGED SLIGHTS TO CHINA'S STATUS AS A GREAT SOVEREIGN NATION ENTITLED TO BE TREATED WITH THE RESPECT DUE AN EQUAL OF THE UNITED STATES. NEITHER SUSPICION NOR RESENTMENT ARE NEW IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS; THEY HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO BE OVERCOME AT EVERY STAGE OF US-CHINA RAPPROCHEMENT. BUT SUSPICIONS NOW RUN SO HIGH, AND CENTER SO MUCH ON THE PRESIDENT'S OWN SUPPOSED VIEWS (REF A), THAT

SECRET

State Dept. review completed

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02

BEIJIN 03819 01 OF 02 291052Z

IT WILL TAKE AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC OR PRIVATE STATEMENT BY, OR SOURCED TO THE PRESIDENT TO ALLAY THEM. WITHOUT THIS, IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL WE CAN PREVENT THE RELATIONSHIP FROM "RETROGRESSING".

4. THE CHINESE HAVE CHARACTERISTICALLY EXPRESSED THEIR MAJOR POINTS OF CONCERN DELPHICALLY, IN A SERIES OF CODE WORDS AND CATCH PHRASES. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THEIR CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS:

-- THE U.S. INTENDS TO ENGINEER THE INDEFINITE SEPARATION OF TAIWAN FROM THE REST OF CHINA (BOTH FOR IDEOLOGICAL REASONS AND FOR USE AS AN "UNSINKABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER") AND IS COLLUDING WITH THE CHINESE ON THE ISLAND TO THAT END;

-- DESPITE U.S. TRANSFER OF RECOGNITION AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS FROM TAIPEI TO BEIJING, THE U.S. CONTINUES TO BE MORE RESPONSIVE TO TAIPEI'S CLAIMS ON IT THAN TO THE "STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE" OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH BEIJING.


-- U.S. EXPORT AND MUNITIONS CONTROL AND OTHER POLICIES (E.G. GSP) CONTINUE IN PRACTICE TO BE MUCH MORE FRIENDLY TOWARD TAIPEI THAN BEIJING DESPITE THE SWITCH IN FORMAL RELATIONS, SHOWING WHERE OUR TRUE SYMPATHIES AMONG THE PARTIES TO THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR STILL LIE;

-- THE U.S. TAKES CHINA FOR GRANTED AS A WEAK AND PASSIVE, "JUNIOR PARTNER" IN WORLD-WIDE EFFORTS TO BLOCK SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL ADVANCE;

-- THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT IT CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Department of State***INCOMING
TELEGRAM****SECRET**

PAGE 03

BEIJIN 03819 01 OF 02 291052Z

CHINESE WEAKNESS EITHER TO IMPOSE ITS VIEWS OR TO PURCHASE CHINESE ACQUIESCENCE IN ITS POLICIES TOWARD TAIWAN.

5. RUNNING THROUGH ALL OF THESE CHARGES IS A CHINESE SENSE THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO TREAT THEM AS EQUALS BUT AS SUBORDINATES AND THAT WE WANT TO MANIPULATE THEM TO OUR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THEY THINK THAT WE DO NOT RESPECT THEIR VIEWS OR HEED THEIR CONCERNS. CHINESE PRIDE DICTATES STIFFNECKED REJECTION OF A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN EQUALITY AND MUTUAL RESPECT.

6. CHINESE DISTRUST OF OUR INTENTIONS MAY BE ENTIRELY WITHOUT MERIT, AND STATED IN WAYS THAT ARE BOTH OFFENSIVE AND SELF-SERVING. BUT THE DEPTH OF THEIR EMOTION AND SUSPICION IS A FACT WITH WHICH WE MUST DEAL IF OUR TALKS ARE TO SUCCEED. WE NEED TO ADDRESS THEIR CONCERNS DIRECTLY AND FORTHRIGHTLY IN A STATEMENT THAT CAN BE SOURCED AUTHORITATIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT. SUCH A STATEMENT SHOULD BE COINED IN

SECRET**NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY**



29 MAR 82 11 06z
Department of State

1812394
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET

NOD345

PAGE 01 BEIJIN 03819 02 OF 02 291055Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----024671 291056Z /11

O 291034Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1238

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 03819

NODIS

TERMS OF U.S. INTERESTS RATHER THAN "PRINCIPLES,"
ABOUT WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN TALKING FAR TOO MUCH,
IT SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY CAST AS AN ATTEMPT TO CLEAR
THE AIR.

6. THE STATEMENT I ORIGINALLY PROPOSED TO COMMEMORATE
THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE (REF B) WAS DESIGNED TO
ACCOMPLISH THIS PURPOSE ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE. IN
LIGHT OF OTHER CHINESE NEURALGIC POINTS, WE OBVIOUSLY
WOULD NEED NOW IN ADDITION TO PUT FORWARD BOTH A CLEAR
AND CONVINCING PRESENTATION ON HOW WE SEE OUR STRATEGIC
PARTNERSHIP WITH THE PRC, AND AN AFFIRMATION THAT WE
KNOW WE NEED THEM AS MUCH AS THEY NEED US. WE SHOULD
NOTE THAT OUR RECOGNITION OF THIS IS REFLECTED IN OUR
WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, AND END WITH A PITCH TO GET
ON WITH OUR TALKS.

7. I SUGGEST THAT SUCH A PRESENTATION SHOULD BE MADE AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE TO AMBASSADOR CHAI IN WASHINGTON BY THE
VICE PRESIDENT AND/OR SECRETARY OF STATE. IT SHOULD BE
CALLED ON SHORT NOTICE TO PREVENT CHAI FROM RECEIVING
INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A TENDENTIOUS, CANNED RESPONSE.
THE OBJECT WOULD BE TO GET HIM TO LISTEN, NOT TO RESPOND,
AND THE TALK SHOULD START WITH A FORTHRIGHT U.S. STATE-
MENT THAT THE PRC HAS COMPLETELY MISUNDERSTOOD USG IN-

SECRET

overtaken
by President's
decision to
write letters
to Deng and
Zhao

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02

BEIJIN 03819 02 OF 02 291055Z

TENTIONS AND HARBORS THE SUSPICIONS OUTLINED IN PARA 4
ABOVE. I WOULD HOPE THAT THE RESPONSE MIGHT COME HERE,
IN THE FORM OF A MORE COMPROMISING CHINESE ATTITUDE IN
OUR TALKS, HUMMEL

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY